Certainty effect
Certainty effect refers to the psychological effect resulted from the reduction of probability from certainty to probable (Tversky & Kahneman 1986). It is an idea introduced in prospect theory.
Normally a reduction in probability of winning a reward (e.g. reduce from 80% to 20% of chance of winning a reward) creates psychological effect such as displeasure to individuals, which leads to the perception of loss from the original probability thus favoring a risk-aversion decision. However, the same reduction results in larger psychological effect when it is done from certainty than from uncertainty.
Example
Tversky & Kahneman (1986) illustrated the certainty effect by the following examples.
First, consider this example:
Which of the following options do you prefer?
- A. a sure gain of $30
- B. 80% chance to win $45 and 20% chance to win nothing
In this case, 78% of participants chose option A while only 22% chose option B. This demonstrates the typical risk-aversion phenomenon in prospect theory and framing effect because the expected value of option B ($45x0.8=$36) exceeds that of A by 20%.
Now, consider this problem:
Which of the following options do you prefer?
- C. 25% chance to win $30 and 75% chance to win nothing
- D. 20% chance to win $45 and 80% chance to win nothing
In this case, 42% of participants chose option C while 58% chose option D.
As before, the expected value of the first option ($30x0.25=$7.50) was 20% lower than that of option B ($45x.0.2=9) however, when neither option was certain, risk-taking increased.
See also
Bibliography
Papers
- Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel (1981). "The Framing of decisions and the psychology of choice" (PDF). Science. 211 (4481): 453–458. doi:10.1126/science.7455683. PMID 7455683.
- Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel (1986). "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions" (PDF). The Journal of Business. 59 (S4): S251. doi:10.1086/296365.
General references
- Baron, Jonathan (2006). "Chapter 11: Prospect theory". Thinking and Deciding (4th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 262. ISBN 978-0-521-68043-1.