Gillett v Holt
| Gillett v Holt | |
|---|---|
| Court | Court of Appeal |
| Citation(s) | [2001] Ch 210 |
| Keywords | |
| Proprietary estoppel | |
Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 is an English land law case concerning proprietary estoppel.
Facts
In 1956, at age 12, Geoffrey Gillett met Mr. Holt, a 38-year-old gentleman farmer at Woodhall Spa golf club and became his caddie and friend. In 1956, he began working on Mr. Holt's farm, The Limes, continuing this work over 38 years and in 1971 moved into a farmhouse, The Beeches, which was acquired by Mr. Holt’s company, KAHL. Mr. Holt had made seven separate representations to Gillett, from 1964 to 1989, as to his eventual inheritance of the farm - such as "all this will be yours" after Gillett brought in his first harvest in 1964 and at the christening of his first child in 1971, and "it was all going to be yours anyway" in 1975.
However, in 1995, Mr. Holt tried to sack Gillett and remove him from The Beeches and altered his will, removing him as main beneficiary in favour of Mr Wood, met in 1992. Gillett claimed proprietary estoppel, with a view to being able to remain in possession of The Beeches, and acquiring part of The Limes.
The trial judge found against Gillett, applying Taylor v Dickens [1998] 1 FLR 806, 821, holding that a promise to leave property in a will could not give rise to a proprietary estoppel because wills are inherently revocable. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal, rejecting the 'irrevocable promise' approach and adopting a liberal view of the requirement of detriment.
Judgment
Robert Walker LJ held that Mr Gillett was entitled to a share of the property and could not simply be ejected. As he said, ‘the fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine. In the end the court must look at the matter in the round…’ The assurances of 1975 ‘were intended to be relied on, and were in fact relied on.’ He noted the criticism of Taylor v Dickens, Professor Swadling commenting the decision is ‘clearly wrong’ because the whole point is they are promised ‘unsupported by consideration, are initially revocable’ but they are made binding by detrimental reliance, and then there is no question of the promisor changing their mind. There is a need for detriment, and noted the judge focused on Mr Gillett being underpaid.
| “ | The overwhelming weight of authority shows that detriment is required. But the authorities also show that it is not a narrow or technical concept. The detriment need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial...
There must be sufficient causal link between the assurance relied on and the detriment asserted… Whether the detriment is sufficiently substantial is to be tested by whether it would be unjust or inequitable to allow the assurance to be disregarded - that is, again, the essential test of unconcsionability. The detriment alleged must be pleaded and proved… |
” |
Apart from being underpaid, Mr Gillett said he did not look for other employment, spent more time than a normal employee, spent money improving The Beeches, which was barely habitable when bought in 1971, new fittings and materials, working himself, and took no steps to secure his future, for example through getting a pension. The judge did not look at the matter in the round, and Mr Gillett’s case on detriment ‘was an unusually compelling one.’ What matters is that there would be a detriment if there were no proprietary estoppel claim, citing Dixon J in Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd (1938) 59 CLR 641, 674-5. So the freehold of The Beeches, including the farmhouse and 42 hectares of land should be transferred, and £100,000 should be paid as compensation for receiving none of The Limes.