Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Co.

Lorraine v. Markel

United States District Court for the District of Maryland

Decided May 4, 2007
Full case name Jack R. Lorraine and Beverly Mack v. Markel American Insurance Company
Citations 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007)
Holding Neither party provided admissible evidence to support the facts set forth in their respective motions for summary judgment
Judge Paul W. Grimm
Laws applied Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence

Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company, 241 F.R.D. 534 (D.Md. May 4, 2007) is a case in which a landmark decision about the admissibility and authentication of digital evidence was set down in the form of a 100-page opinion [1] by Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm.

Facts

Jack R. Lorraine and Beverly Mack had a yacht that was damaged by lightning. While Markel American Insurance Company already awarded costs for repair, more damage was found at a later stage when the yacht was removed from the water. In order to assess the additional damages, both parties entered into an arbitration agreement to assess if these damages were also due to the lightning strike. While both parties seek to confirm and enforce the arbitrator’s decision, this case comes forth from the ambiguous language used in the arbitration agreement regarding the authority of the arbitrator. Where Lorraine (plaintiff) argues that he is entitled to the sum of $36,000 as it was found that the damages came indeed from the lightning strike, Markel (defendant) argues that they acknowledge the damages to be reimbursed, but only to a limit of $14,000 as recommended by the arbitrator. Both parties moved for summary judgment, providing documentary evidence in the form of the arbitration agreement, award, and copies of e-mail correspondence between counsel.

Decision

Ruling

Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm stated that although the language of the arbitration agreement is indeed ambiguous enough to proceed with a trial, neither party provided admissible evidence to support the facts set forth in their respective motions for summary judgment under rule 56[2] of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the following reasons:

Both motions were dismissed without prejudice.

Opinion

Because Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm found that guidance is needed for counsel to properly admit Electronically Stored Information (ESI) into evidence at trial or for use in summary judgment, he decided to provide broad analysis and guidance in his opinion. He summarized that whenever ESI is offered as evidence, either the judge or jury can make a preliminary determination regarding the admissibility of evidence under rule 104(a) or (b) respectively.[7] If the jury decides, the Federal Rules of Evidence still apply; however when the judge makes the decision, they do not apply anymore. When no preliminary determination is made, five more distinct yet interrelated evidence rules must be considered:

Consequences / Aftermath

With this opinion, Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm has established a detailed baseline for the use of ESI before his court. Given the guidelines and references provided by the judge, it now becomes difficult for counsel to argue admissibility of electronic evidence. With this guide at hand, one can easily determine beforehand which evidence will and will not be allowed in trial, and provide a thorough framework of protection for both the plaintiff and the defendant.

References

External links

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